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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Margie Lorraine Mocaby appeals from the judgement of the district court entered
upon a jury finding her guilty of trafficking in heroin, possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia and of being a habitual offender.
On appeal Mocaby alleges prosecutorial misconduct in the closing argument and
that the district court abused its discretion regarding the indeterminate portion of
Mocaby’s sentence. Mocaby’s allegations are without merit and support in the record.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mocaby was on probation. (8/31/2016 Tr., p. 2, L. 11 – p. 5, L. 11.) During a
home visit, officers searched the trailer where she lived. (Id.) It was a single occupant,
single-wide trailer. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 185, L. 22 – p. 186, L. 22.) The initial officers,
Officers Kiehl and McDonald, searched the trailer and found drug paraphernalia. (See
2/13/17 Tr., p. 136, L. 2 – p. 137, L. 23, p. 154, L. 13 – p. 155, L. 7.) In the bedroom,
Officer McDonald saw a scale, a tinfoil with burnt residue on the bed, and Ziploc bags
that appeared to contain drugs. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 155, L. 21 – p. 162, L. 19; Exs. 1-3.)
Officer Harr and a crime scene investigator, Officer Hilton, were then called in to
search, and they searched the bedroom. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 187, L. 19 – p. 196, L. 16; Exs.
1-3.) On the bed they found several rolls of money rolled and wrapped in rubber bands.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 193, Ls. 11-20, p. 204, Ls. 8-21; Exs. 1, 9.) Inside a Hefty Ziploc bag on
the bed, there were several other smaller Ziploc bags that contained what appeared to be
heroin and “white crystal meth.” (2/13/17 Tr., p. 195, L. 25 – p. 196, L. 16; Ex. 3.)
1

Detective Montoya conducted a field NIK test on the white substance and it tested
presumptive positive for methamphetamine. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 267, L. 1 – p. 269, L. 21.)
The other substance in the other Ziploc baggies tested presumptively positive for heroin.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 267, L. 22 – p. 271, L. 2.) Detective Montoya sent the substances to the
Idaho State Forensics Lab for testing. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 271, L. 3 – p. 273, L. 9.) The
Idaho State Lab confirmed that the substances were heroin and methamphetamine.
(2/14/17 Tr., p. 364, L. 15 – p. 368, L. 14, p. 371, L. 22 – p. 378, L. 18.)
The state charged Mocaby with trafficking in heroin, possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R.,
pp. 53-54.) The state also filed a habitual offender enhancement. (R., pp. 70-71, 79-82.)
The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 120-129, 131-145.)
During opening argument, Mocaby argued that there were other people in and
around Mocaby’s house and thus the heroin and methamphetamine could have been
theirs. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 127, L. 18 – p. 131, L. 23.)
At trial, Officer Kiehl testified that when he entered the trailer, he did not see
anyone else inside. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 135, Ls. 10-16.) Officer Kiehl did see a man
watering the grass in the backyard. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 135, Ls. 17 – p. 136, L. 1.) Officer
Kiehl asked Mocaby if anyone else was in the residence, and she “originally said no.”
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-23.)
In Mocaby’s living room Officer Kiehl testified he found a small digital scale,
burnt aluminum foil and a razor blade, all of which appeared to be drug paraphernalia.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 136, L. 2 – p. 137, L. 23.) Officer McDonald testified when he entered
2

the bedroom he saw cell phones, lady’s deodorant, a purse, a scale, and a tinfoil with
burnt residue on the bed. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 155, L. 21 – p. 162, L. 19; Exs. 1-3.) He saw
Ziploc bags that appeared to contain drugs. (Id.) There was some testimony that an
individual named Justin Navarro was found inside or around the trailer. (See 2/13/17 Tr.,
p. 163, Ls. 3-25, p. 169, Ls. 20-25, p. 174, Ls. 11-17, p. 176, L. 17 – p. 177, L. 4.)
Officer Harr and a crime scene investigator, Officer Hilton, searched the bedroom.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 187, L. 19 – p. 211, L. 21; Exs. 1-15.) Officer Hilton took photographs of
the bedroom. (Id.) There was female clothing hanging in the bedroom closet. (2/13/17
Tr., p. 180, L. 1 – p. 191, L. 1.) The shoes in the bedroom were female shoes. (Id.)
Female underwear was in the dresser drawers. (Id.) Nothing in the room gave Officer
Harr the indication that the room was occupied by a male. (Id.) All indications pointed
to the bedroom being occupied by a female. (Id.)
On the bed there was a smaller purse, like a makeup bag, and several rolls of
money rolled and wrapped in rubber bands. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 193, Ls. 11-20, p. 204, Ls. 821; Ex. 1, 9.) Inside a Hefty Ziploc bag were several other smaller Ziploc bags containing
the heroin and methamphetamine. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 195, L. 25 – p. 196, L. 16, p. 202, L.
24 – p. 203, L. 25; Exs. 3, 7.)
The scale on the bed was the type that can be used to weigh drugs. (2/13/17 Tr.,
p. 198, L. 16 – p. 199, L. 20; Ex. 4.) Also on the bed were a list of phone numbers, a
purse with bags of needles inside, and small, clear plastic baggies that are commonly used
to distribute drugs. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 200, L. 20 – p. 202, L. 23, p. 205, L. 18 – p. 206, L. 1;
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Exs. 5, 6, 11.) Also on the bed was paperwork showing Mocaby was renting the trailer.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 207, L. 14 – p. 208, L. 15; Ex. 14.)
Officer Harr testified that when she transported Mocaby to the jail, Mocaby
spontaneously asked how much the heroin weighed. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 214, L. 5 – p. 216,
L. 9; Ex. 16.)
Detective Montoya testified that the white substance found in the smaller baggy
tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 267, L. 1 – p. 269, L.
21.) The other substance in the other baggies tested presumptive positive for heroin.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 267, L. 22 – p. 271, L. 2.) There were two kinds of heroin, brown heroin
which is cheaper and easier to smoke and the darker black heroin. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 271, L.
8 – p. 272, L. 3.) Detective Montoya also collected $3,440 in cash from the scene.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 286, L. 6 – p. 289, L. 20.) Officer Green testified that his drug dog
alerted on the money. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 336, L. 5 – p. 348, L. 18.)
Corinna Owsley, a forensic scientist for the Idaho State Police, testified. (2/14/17
Tr., p. 351, L. 10 – p. 355, L. 20.) Ms. Owsley testified that the white powder visually
appeared to be methamphetamine. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 371, Ls. 7-21; Ex. 37.) Ms. Owsley
tested the powder and the test showed it contained methamphetamine. (2/14/17 Tr., p.
364, L. 15 – p. 368, L. 14; Ex. 37.) Ms. Owsley did a screening test and then a
confirmatory test on the other substances in the baggies. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 371, L. 22 – p.
378, L. 18; Exs. 38-39.) Both the screening and confirmatory tests showed the other
substances contained heroin. (Id.)
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Sharmaine Mocaby, Mocaby’s mother, testified for the defense. (2/14/17 Tr., p.
412, L. 3 – p. 422, L. 21.) She testified that there was a “kid” named Justin at the trailer
park and he had a metal box with papers and a pipe. (Id.) She also testified there was “a
couple of girls” over earlier who were trading clothes with Mocaby. (Id.)
During closing argument the prosecutor explained that the state had the burden of
proof and went through the elements of the crimes. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 465, L. 12 – p.
493, L. 13.)
And so the standard of proof that’s been discussed, the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, applies to those facts. It is those fact, those
elements of the crime that you must find beyond a reasonable doubt exist
in order for you to convict and find the defendant guilty.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 466, Ls. 20-25.)
Defense counsel argued that the police just assumed the drugs belonged to
Mocaby and did not investigate whether the drugs belonged to other people who may
have been present. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 493, L. 19 – p. 511, L. 9.) In rebuttal the prosecutor
argued that all of the evidence pointed to Mocaby possessing the drugs and there was no
evidence that someone else put those drugs in the bedroom. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 511, L.
13 – p. 525, L. 7.)
The jury found Mocaby guilty of all three charges. (R., p. 170.) The jury also
found that Mocaby had committed two prior felonies and thus was a habitual offender.
(R., p. 171.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court entered judgment and imposed
the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years fixed for trafficking in excess of 28 grams
of heroin, plus 16 years indeterminate. (R., pp. 189-195; see also I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(6).)
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The district court ran the other two sentences concurrently with the trafficking sentence.
(See id.) Mocaby timely appealed. (R., pp. 197-200.)
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ISSUES
Mocaby states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in sentencing Ms. Mocaby to
thirty-one years, with fifteen years fixed, following her convictions for
trafficking in heroin, possession of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Mocaby failed to show prosecutorial misconduct and fundamental
error in the closing argument?
2.
Has Mocaby failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
sentenced Mocaby to 16 years indeterminate?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Mocaby’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Fails All Three Prongs Of The Fundamental
Error Analysis

A.

Introduction
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the state had proven all of the

elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 465, L. 12 – p. 493, L.
13, p. 511, L. 13 – p. 525, L. 7.) The prosecutor told the jury to consider the evidence and
deliberate carefully. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 – p. 525, L. 6.) The state responded
to Mocaby’s argument that other people could have placed the drugs in her bedroom by
pointing out there was little to no evidence to support this theory. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p.
475, L. 19 – p. 476, L. 17, p. 513, L. 13 – p. 525, L. 7.)
On appeal, Mocaby argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting
to fundamental error by arguing that the state had proven its case. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 5-16.) “The prosecutor improperly told the jury it had proven its case and thus the
jury was required to find Ms. Mocaby guilty.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11) Mocaby’s
appellate argument is without any merit and fails all three prongs of the fundamental error
analysis. It is not prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to argue that the state
proved its case.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson,
8

147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to timely object at
trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228,
245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection may only
be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho
259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection “the
appellate court’s authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the
error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due
process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that “one or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the
constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need for any
additional information” including information “as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision”; and (3) the “defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights,” generally by showing a reasonable probability that the
error “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

C.

Mocaby’s Selective Quotes Fail To Show Any Prosecutorial Misconduct And Fail
All Three Prongs Of The Fundamental Error Analysis
Mocaby has failed to show any prosecutorial misconduct during closing

arguments. The prosecutor’s arguments were properly based upon the jury instructions
9

and the evidence introduced at trial. There was no objection at trial and Mocaby has
failed to show any of the three prongs necessary to establish fundamental error. Each of
Mocaby’s meritless arguments will be addressed in turn.

1.

The Prosecutor Properly Told The Jury To Do Its Job And Consider The
Evidence And To Deliberate Carefully And Return A Verdict That Speaks
To The Truth

The state argued that it had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and now it
was the jury’s job to consider all of the evidence. (2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 – p. 525, L.
6.) Mocaby argues that what this argument amounted to was fundamental error, because
the prosecutor used the words “do your job” and “speak the truth.” (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 8-9.) Mocaby claims that these comments amounted to the prosecutor telling
the jury it was its job to find Mocaby guilty and amounted to a misstatement of the
burden of proof. (Id.) Mocaby’s argument is without merit.
The record does not support Mocaby’s selective interpretation of the prosecutor’s
argument. The prosecutor did not tell the jury that its job was to find Mocaby guilty, nor
did the prosecutor misstate the burden of proof. The prosecutor properly argued that the
state had “proven beyond a reasonable doubt” that Mocaby was guilty and that the jury’s
job is to consider the evidence and deliberate carefully. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 –
p. 525, L. 6.)
Ladies and gentlemen, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant is guilty of all of the charges. It’s now your turn to do your job
as jurors in this case and consider this evidence, to deliberate upon it
carefully, and return the verdict that speaks the truth. That is the defendant
is guilty of the charges.
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(2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 – p. 525, L. 6.) This argument is not misconduct. It did not
tell the jury it was its job to find Mocaby guilty, nor does it misstate the burden of proof.
It clearly stated the correct burden of proof. It is especially not misconduct when the
argument is considered in context of the prosecutor’s full argument. Mocaby’s argument
fails all three prongs of the fundamental error analysis.
Mocaby fails the first prong of the fundamental error analysis because telling the
jury its job is to “consider this evidence, to deliberate upon it carefully, and return the
verdict that speaks the truth” does not violate one of Mocaby’s unwaived constitutional
rights. “A defendant’s right to a fair trial is impacted ‘[w]here a prosecutor attempts to
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and
the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from that evidence.’” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 145, 334 P.3d 806, 819 (2014)
(quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979). “It is improper to misrepresent or
mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871,
332 P.3d 767, 783 (2014) (quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133, 294 P.3d 1137,
1145 (Ct. App. 2013). “Indeed, the prosecutor ‘has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of
the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.’” Id. (citing State v. Griffiths, 101
Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by State v.
LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981)). Generally the parties are given wide
latitude in making closing arguments to the jury and discussing the evidence and
inferences that can be made therefrom. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, ___, 408
P.3d 38, 45 (2017) (citing Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440).
11

Here, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the facts and based his argument on the
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. The district court instructed
that jury that its duty is to determine the facts and decide the case. (R., pp. 155-156.)
“Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instruction to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case.” (R., p. 155.) “As members of the jury it
is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those facts to the law that I have
given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented in this case.” (R.,
p. 158.) The district court also instructed the jury on the elements of each of the charged
crimes, and then instructed the jury that it must find the defendant guilty if each of the
elements had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (R., pp. 160-162.) As to each
charge the district court instructed: “If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.”

(Id.)

Thus when the

prosecutor argued that the state had proven its case “beyond a reasonable doubt” and
“[i]t’s now your turn to do your job as jurors in this case and consider this evidence, to
deliberate upon it carefully, and return the verdict that speaks the truth” it was an
argument that was squarely based upon the law in the jury instructions.
In support of her argument, Mocaby cites to a Washington state case and a New
York state case where the courts have found that telling a jury that its job is to “speak the
truth” is a misstatement of the burden of proof. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9 (citing
State v. Lindsay, 326 P.3d 125 (Wash. 2014); People v. Jackson, 571 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991)). Other cases have looked to the context of the prosecutor’s
12

argument and held that a reference to “truth” during closing argument is not necessarily
improper. See e.g. LeFleur v. State, 569 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(argument to return a verdict that speaks the truth did not interject personal belief and did
not “rise to the impermissible level of instructing a jury on its duties”); Dunlap v. State,
21 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (in the context of an argument regarding the
jury’s role as factfinder it was not improper to reference the “truth”).
Regardless, the two cases cited by Mocaby do not help her because it is clear that
the prosecutor in this case did not misrepresent the burden of proof. The Washington
Supreme Court first noted that there was some conflict whether “an exhortation to the
jury to ‘speak the truth’ is improper.” See Lindsay, 326 P.3d at 132. Then in a rather
cursory conclusion, the Washington Supreme Court decided that it was improper because
it was the “jury’s duty to determine whether the State has proved its allegations against a
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 220 P.3d 1273
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009)). Similarly the New York Appellate Court also made a cursory
conclusion that describing a jury trial as “the search for the truth” has been disapproved
by appellate courts. See Jackson, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 724).
However, here the prosecutor did not describe a trial as a search for the truth, or
misstate the burden of proof. The prosecutor clearly stated burden of proof, that the state
had “proven beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of all the charges.”
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 – p. 525, L. 6.) The prosecutor then explained that the jury’s
job is to “consider this evidence, to deliberate upon it carefully, and return the verdict that
speaks the truth. That is the defendant is guilty of the charges.” (See id.) Any reasonable
13

reading of this argument demonstrates that the prosecutor was not changing the burden of
proof, but was telling the jury that the state had proven its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Further, Mocaby’s argument that the prosecutor was misstating the burden of
proof deliberately ignores the rest of the prosecutor’s closing argument. The prosecutor
repeatedly explained to the jury that the state had to prove the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt:
And so the standard of proof that’s been discussed, the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, applies to those facts. It is those facts, those
elements of the crime that you must find beyond a reasonable doubt exist
in order for you to convict and find the defendant guilty.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 466, Ls. 20-25.) And again:
So I’d like to start by talking to you about those elements. So this is Count
One that I want to talk about first. That’s the trafficking in heroin charge.
Now these – you can see that there are five elements – these are five
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you
to find the defendant guilty.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 467, Ls. 16-22.) And again:
And so you have proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this – these crimes,
all three of them occurred on or about April 21st, 2016.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 468, Ls. 15-18.) And again:
It also occurred here in the state of Idaho. The proof is clear and beyond a
reasonable doubt on that as well.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 468, Ls. 19-21.) And again:
Officer Harr responded to the trailer court on Linda Vista Lane and you
know that all of these things happened at that trailer, the relevant events
surrounding possession, the trafficking. So you know beyond a reasonable
doubt that both of those elements have been proven.
14

(2/15/17 Tr., p. 469, Ls. 1-7.) And again:
It’s just these elements that you have to find beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 474, Ls. 17-19.) And again:
But all of these facts form your conclusion and helps you make that
reasonable, common sense inference to say, yeah, we have enough
information from the facts, from the circumstances, from the evidence
presented, from the testimony to conclude here beyond a reasonable doubt
that that’s Margie Mocaby’s stuff.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 474, L. 20 – p. 475, L. 1.) And again:
You know that she possessed the heroin beyond a reasonable doubted
[sic]. Element 3 has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 476, Ls. 15-18.) And again:
Then you’re further instructed that the specific amount that you have to
find is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that what she possessed was at
least 28 grams of heroin.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 477, Ls. 4-8.) And again:
Finally, this one’s proven beyond a reasonable doubt: There’s those four
packages. There’s three baggies and then the bindle that Detective
Montoya testified about, they all had – he observed it, it all looked exactly
the same. You could see it in the pictures.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 482, Ls. 6-11.) And again:
And so you know beyond a reasonable doubt that Margie Lorraine Mocaby
on or about April 21st, 2016, in the State of Idaho, knowingly possessed in
excess, in fact, at least what was in excess of 28 grams of heroin and she
knew it.
That means, as you’re instructed, that each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. You’re
instructed you must find her guilty. All of those have been proven.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 14-23.) And again:
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The circumstances tell you that she knew it was methamphetamine or
believed it was a controlled substance. Okay. So all four of those are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 487, Ls. 7-10.) And again:
So you know beyond a reasonable doubt from this evidence that the
defendant not only possessed methamphetamine, she intended to deliver it
to another.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 490, L. 25 – p. 491, L. 3.) And again:
The words below, the paragraphs below, the elements on this instruction,
again, tell you of some of the things that you can consider in making this
inference, because that’s what you’re doing, you’re taking bits and pieces
of information and you’re drawing a conclusion, a logical conclusion
based upon reason and common sense. And when based on reason and
common sense you’re convinced beyond a doubt, based on reason and
common sense that these facts are true, you are instructed to find her
guilty.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 491, Ls. 4-14.) And again:
Intending to inject, store, pack, et cetera, all of these including inhaling,
preparing, packing a controlled substance, whether it’s heroin or
methamphetamine, either one, you know beyond a reasonable doubt
Margie Lorraine Mocaby is guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. All
of those elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 492, L. 20 – p. 493, L. 2.) And again:
The State does carry the burden of proof in this case and it’s important that
this case be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and it has been.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 511, Ls. 16-19.) And again:
And I want to caution you about one thing. [Defense Counsel], as he
concluded his remarks to you today, has talked about you holding the
State, me, as the prosecutor in this case, to my burden of proof because if
we’re going to do something to the defendant, on and on. You’re
instructed you’re not to consider the subject of penalty of punishment in
this case. You are here to determine the facts and apply the law the judge
has given you to those facts. You set aside any concern about what is
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going to happen. Okay. We’re focusing on what has been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 511, L. 20 – p. 512, L. 7.) And again:
You are here to determine whether from the evidence that has been
presented that you can draw beyond a reasonable doubt the conclusions
that the defendant is guilty of the charges. That’s your job.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 519, Ls. 21-25.) Mocaby’s argument that the prosecutor was somehow
attempting to misstate or shift the burden of proof is without support in the record and is a
selective misreading of the argument.

Mocaby has failed the first prong of the

fundamental error analysis.
Mocaby also fails the second prong of the fundamental error analysis, because
even if there was an error, it was not clear error. The prosecutor told the jury to do its job
to consider the evidence and deliberate carefully. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 524, L. 25 – p. 525,
L. 6.) There is no clear error. It is not clear from the record that the prosecutor was
telling the jury that its job was to find the defendant guilty. What is clear is that the
prosecutor was telling the jury that its job was to consider all the evidence, and the truth
of that evidence is that Mocaby was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, as
described above, the prosecutor did not misstate or mispresent the burden of proof. The
prosecutor was very clear that the state had the burden of proofing of the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no clear error. Mocaby has failed the
second prong of the fundamental error analysis.
Mocaby also fails the third prong, because even if there was error – which there
was not – it was harmless. Mocaby has failed to show a reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,
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245 P.3d at 978. Given the context of the prosecutor’s argument and the evidence of
Mocaby’s guilt, any error in the closing argument would not have affected the outcome of
the trial. See e.g. State v. Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032, 1052 (Maine 2012) (even assuming the
prosecutor’s argument to return a verdict that “speaks the truth” was erroneous, the
argument when taken in context, did not affect the outcome of the case).
Here, officers found Ziploc baggies containing two kinds of heroin and
methamphetamine on the bed in Mocaby’s bedroom. (See 2/13/17 Tr., p. 155, L. 21 – p.
162, L. 19, p. 195, L. 25 – p. 196, L. 16, p. 202, L. 24 – p. 203, L. 25, p. 267, L. 1 – p.
272, L. 3; Exs. 1-3, 7.) Near the drugs, on the bed, officers found, lady’s deodorant, a
purse, a scale, and a tinfoil with burnt residue on it. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 155, L. 21 – p. 162,
L. 19; Exs. 1-3.) On the bed there was a smaller purse, like a makeup bag, on the bed that
had $3,440 in cash rolled and wrapped in rubber bands. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 193, Ls. 11-20,
p. 204, Ls. 8-21, p. 286, L. 6 – p. 289, L. 20; Exs. 1, 9.) Officer Green testified that his
drug dog alerted on the money. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 336, L. 5 – p. 348, L. 18.)
The evidence also showed drug distribution. The scale on the bed is the type that
can be used to weigh drugs. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 198, L. 16 – p. 199, L. 20; Ex. 4.) Also on
the bed were a list of phone numbers, a purse with bags of needles inside, and small, clear
plastic baggies that are commonly used to distribute drugs. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 200, L. 20 –
p. 202, L. 23, p. 205, L. 18 – p. 206, L. 1; Exs. 5, 6, 11.) Also on the bed was paperwork
showing Mocaby was renting the trailer. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 207, L. 14 – p. 208, L. 15; Ex.
14.)
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There was additional evidence that the bedroom belonged to Mocaby and that she
knew about the heroin. Female clothing was hanging in the bedroom closet. (2/13/17
Tr., p. 180, L. 1 – p. 191, L. 1.) The shoes in the bedroom were female shoes. (Id.)
Female underwear was in the dresser drawers.

(Id.) All indications pointed to the

bedroom being occupied by a female. (Id.) Further, when Officer Harr transported
Mocaby to the jail, Mocaby spontaneously asked Officer Harr how much the heroin
weighed. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 214, L. 5 – p. 216, L. 9; Ex. 16.)
Corinna Owsley, a forensic scientist, tested the substances and the tests showed
they contained methamphetamine and heroin. (2/14/17 Tr., p. 364, L. 15 – p. 368, L. 14,
p. 371, L. 22 – p. 378, L. 18; Exs. 37-39.) The prosecutor’s argument to the jury that the
jury should do its job and consider the evidence and deliberate carefully and delivery a
verdict that speaks to the truth did not change the outcome of the trial. Mocaby has failed
the third prong of the fundamental error analysis.

2.

Mocaby’s Defense Was The Drugs Could Have Belonged To Other People
Who May Have Been In And Around The House, And The Prosecutor Did
Not Err By Arguing There Was Little Evidence To Support Mocaby’s
Defense

The prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he argued that the evidence
pointed to Mocaby possessing the drugs and that the defense argument, that there were
alternate persons who could have possessed the drugs, was not supported by the evidence.
During opening argument, Mocaby argued that there were other people in Mocaby’s
house and thus the heroin and methamphetamine could have been theirs, but the police
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just assumed the drugs belonged to Mocaby. (2/13/17 Tr., p. 127, L. 18 – p. 131, L. 23.)
Defense counsel asserted, in part:
The whole time that law enforcement was investigating this case, basically
they were operating under the assumption that all of the drugs found
belong to Margie [Mocaby]. There were ample opportunities or
alternative explanations, but they weren’t pursued.
(2/13/17 Tr., p. 130, Ls. 14-19.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor pointed to the evidence that showed
Mocaby possessed the drugs, and there was no evidence in the trailer that pointed to the
drugs belonging to a third party:
So all of the evidence shows – you’ve got Officer McDonald and Kiehl
who go there. This is Ms. Mocaby’s residence. They find her there
outside. They go inside. They find all of these things that lead a person to
a reasonable conclusion. If you were walking into that, that’s the
conclusion that you would reasonably draw.
Knowing that ahead of time, even they’re expecting that they’re going to
Margie Mocaby’s residence, and, in fact, they find evidence that
corroborates that, and there’s really nothing in that room where all of the
evidence – where that heroin right there below the purse was found that
suggests that purse belongs to anybody else other than the defendant,
Margie Mocaby.
She has within her possession, within her physical control, on or about that
date, at some point when she’s in the house or during that time when the
officers were there, she had the power and intention to control that. It’s all
right there within her bedroom. You know that she possessed the heroin
beyond a reasonable doubted [sic]. Element 3 has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 475, L. 19 – p. 476, L. 17.)
During her closing, Mocaby reiterated her defense that the police just assumed the
drugs belonged to her and did not properly investigate any third party to whom the drugs
may belong and the drugs were not hers. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 493, L. 19 – p. 511, L. 8.)
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“So no matter the fact that this is a serious amount of drugs, as the prosecutor has said,
yeah, but you know what, we need to bring the person whose drugs they are accountable
and that’s not Margie [Mocaby]. It’s been assumed from the beginning that it was Margie
[Mocaby], but it’s not Margie [Mocaby].” (2/15/17 Tr., p. 510, Ls. 10-16.)
In rebuttal the prosecutor argued that all of the evidence pointed to Mocaby
possessing the drugs and there was little evidence to support finding someone else was in
the trailer.

(See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 511, L. 13 – p. 525, L. 7.) Regarding Navarro the

prosecutor argued:
Officer Kiehl said he was out in the backyard. There was crossexamination of Officer McDonald where he may have recorded in some
notes that he was inside the house, laundry or something. But that wasn’t
a personal observation that he wrote down. But you know from Officer
Kiehl’s testimony under oath and during this trial he saw him outside
through the window. He said in the backyard maybe watering.
But they want you to assume that all of this stuff in the house must have
come from somewhere else. It’s not Margie Mocaby’s. We don’t know
who. They want you to assume it’s somebody else, notwithstanding all of
the evidence that points to the fact that it’s hers. That’s not reasonable.
That’s not common sense. That’s not what you do in your daily lives as a
human being interacting with other people, understanding the world how it
operates and drawing reasonable conclusions about what you see and what
you hear.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 515, L. 15 – p. 516, L. 9.) The prosecutor went on to explain there was
no evidence showing a third party put the drugs, money and paraphernalia in Mocaby’s
bedroom:
So there’s nothing in the evidence to lead you to the conclusion
that somehow this evidence just mysteriously got dropped in the room or
that these females who – that the defendant’s mother says were there
throughout the day. And all she says is they were there and the insulation
is, well, maybe this stuff came from them. That’s not reasonable either.
Or that Justin Navarro happened to leave his scale and his numerous
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baggies and his four bags of powder heroin and a bag of tar heroin, two
bags of methamphetamine and $3,440 in the bedroom, and that somehow
this ITD document got brought into the bedroom. You have no evidence
to suggest that this is the case.
So everything that you have points to this stuff being in the
bedroom. Who else are we going to pin it on. Mom? She doesn’t
recognize that stuff. She said that’s not my purse. And it’s certainly not
reasonable for you to be sitting here and thinking that the defendant is
blaming her mother and saying, no, that’s actually her stuff.
Who else is there? You draw the inference, look at the evidence
and come to the conclusion, this is Margie Mocaby’s.
Your question is not to determine in this case whether things could
have been done differently or whether things could have been done better
or whether there could have been more that was done. Certainly you can
consider those things, but that’s not the ultimate question that you’re here
to determine. You are here to determine whether from the evidence that
has been presented that you can draw beyond a reasonable doubt the
conclusions that the defendant is guilty of the charges. That is your job.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 518, L. 14 – p. 519, L. 25.)
There was no objection at trial. (See 2/15/17 Tr., p. 515, L. 15 – p. 516, L. 9, p.
518, L. 14 – p. 519, L. 25.) However on appeal, Mocaby claims that this argument by the
state was “impermissibly pushing its burden onto Ms. Mocaby to offer some evidence
that the items in the house did not belong to her.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Mocaby’s
argument is without merit. The prosecutor responded to Mocaby’s defense theory by
pointing to the evidence that was presented at trial. Mocaby fails all three prongs of the
fundamental error analysis.
The prosecutor’s argument, that the evidence showed Mocaby possessed the
drugs, and that the evidence did not point to anyone else, was entirely proper and did not
violate any of Mocaby’s unwaived constitutional rights. A prosecutor can attempt to
22

secure a verdict based upon the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence. See Parker, 157 Idaho at 145, 334 P.3d at 819. Here, the prosecutor’s closing
argument was based upon the evidence admitted at trial. Specifically the evidence that
did not support the defense’s theory that some third party was responsible for the drugs in
Mocaby’s bedroom. Pointing out that the evidence did not support an unnamed third
party being responsible for the drugs is not an improper shifting of the state’s burden. It
was a response to Mocaby’s defense. It is not error to point out the deficiencies in the
defense’s argument. See e.g. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 445, 348 P.3d 1, 60
(2015) (the prosecutor’s argument properly “highlighted to the jury that the defense
presented no alternative explanation as to why Abdullah would drive to Boise that
night”); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 189, 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) (“We
conclude that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument referring to some of defense counsel’s
arguments as red herrings and smoke and mirrors was not misconduct.”)
Nor did the prosecutor’s closing even reference, let alone implicate, Mocaby’s
right not to testify. “Idaho follows the overwhelming number of jurisdictions holding that
a prosecutor’s general references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect on
the defendant’s failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could have
contradicted the evidence.” State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d 400, 402
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1987); Raper v.
Mintzes, 706 F.2d 61, 164 (6th Cir. 1983).) The prosecutor properly argued that any
reasonable interpretation of the evidence pointed to Mocaby’s guilt. Mocaby has utterly
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failed to show any error in this closing argument. Making an argument that the evidence
supports the state’s case and disproves the defense’s theory is not impermissible
argument. It is what an argument is supposed to be.
Mocaby also fails the second prong of the fundamental error analysis. There is no
clear error from the record. The prosecutor’s argument did not reference Mocaby’s Fifth
Amendment right not to testify. Nor was there any statement which clearly shifted the
burden of proof. Instead, as articulated above, this prosecutor diligently and persistently
argued the correct burden of proof. Mocaby has failed to show clear error.
Finally, Mocaby fails to demonstrate that any error was not harmless. As cited
above, the prosecutor repeatedly referenced the correct burden of proof and there is little
probability any error affected the outcome of the trial. The evidence strongly supports the
jury verdicts for trafficking in heroin and possession of methamphetamine with an intent
to deliver. Mocaby fails all three prongs of the fundamental error analysis.

3.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct By Arguing That The State
Had Proven Its Case And The Jury Should Find The Defendant Guilty

The district court instructed the jury that if the state proved the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt the jury was required to find Mocaby guilty. (See R.,
pp. 160-162.) On appeal, Mocaby argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue
that it had proven its case and the jury should find Mocaby guilty. (Appellant’s brief, p.
11.) “The prosecutor improperly told the jury it had proven its case and thus the jury was
required to find Ms. Mocaby guilty.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)
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The prosecutor properly argued that the state had proven its case beyond a
reasonable doubt:
Finally, this one’s proven beyond a reasonable doubt: There’s
those four packages. There’s three baggies and then the bindle that
Detective Montoya testified about, they all had – he observed it, it all
looked exactly the same. You could see it in the pictures. They all look
very similar. They’re found together. It leads to the conclusion that it’s all
the same stuff. He took each individual package before sending it off to
the state lab. You heard him testify about the NIK test, which he testified
that police routinely rely upon as a field test, a presumptive test about what
it is.
You [sic] testimony from Corinna Owsley yesterday about her
presumptive test that she does and she said it’s similar. It’s not necessarily
exactly like the police do. But she, as a forensic scientist, trained, a
profession doing this according to an analytical method – this is part of
what she does – you do these presumptive tests to determine what it is.
So based on his experience and knowing visually, yeah, that looks
like heroin, it’s all the same stuff. He tests first, individually, each of
those packages and determines presumptively, yeah, this is heroin. And
then he sends that to the state lab. And, in fact, Corinna Owsley confirms,
presumptively at first, and then confirms, beyond a reasonable doubt, your
conclusion that that’s heroin.
And she testified about the weight, how she precisely and carefully
weighed it. Her testimony is reliable, how careful she was about making
sure her instruments were working properly, and how they’re calibrated,
how they’re checked regularly. And she accounted for everything and
made sure that she was just weighing the controlled substance. She
weighed that heroin to be over 32 grams – and I’m not going to quote the
exact decimal – 32 and some fraction. But at least 28 grams, and in fact,
in excess of 28 grams of heroin.
And that also included the black tar substance, which, again,
Detective Montoya testified he recognized this is – probably, visually this
is heroin. He NIK tested it. Did the presumptive test on it. Heroin.
Sends it and it’s tested individually. It’s not mixed.
And you’re told she had to have possessed at least 28 grams of
heroin or any mixture or substance with a detectible amount of heroin.
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So once we know that this is heroin, that all of these substances in
each of these bags contain heroin, you don’t have to find that every single
granule in that package was heroin. In fact, that’s not how it’s determined.
You’re told that this is sufficient.
And so you know beyond a reasonable doubt that Margie Lorraine
Mocaby on or about April 21, 2016, in the state of Idaho, knowingly
possessed in excess, in fact, at least what was in excess of 28 grams of
heroin and she knew it.
(2/15/17 Tr., p. 482, L. 6 – p. 484, L. 18.)
This argument does not violate any of Mocaby’s unwaived constitutional rights.
Mocaby argues that this argument told the jury that it did not need to make any
determination regarding the identity of the substances. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11
(citing 2/15/17 Tr., p. 483, Ls. 8-10, 484, Ls. 14-23).) Mocaby’s interpretation of the
prosecutor’s argument is not supported by a plain reading of the transcript.

The

prosecutor went through the facts which support a finding that the substances were heroin
and argued that these facts proved it beyond a reasonable doubt. This is proper argument.
Mocaby’s argument that “[t]he prosecutor improperly told the jury it had proven
its case and thus the jury was required to find Ms. Mocaby guilty” is directly contradicted
by the explicit language of the jury instructions. The jury instructions repeatedly state
that if all of the elements have “been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty.”

(R., pp. 160-162.)

Mocaby’s prosecutorial misconduct

argument is frivolous and fails the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.
Second, even if there was error (which there was not), it was not clear error. It is
not clear error for the prosecutor to argue that the state proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. There is no clear argument to the jury that the jury need not determine
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whether the state proved its case. The prosecutor instead clearly argued that it had
presented evidence, in the form of scientific testing, that showed the substances were,
beyond a reasonable doubt, controlled substances. This is not clearly improper argument
and Mocaby fails the second prong of the fundamental error analysis.
Finally, for the reasons articulated in the preceding section, Mocaby also fails the
third prong of the fundamental error analysis. There is no reasonable probability that any
error affected the outcome of the trial.

There was substantial and un-contradicted

evidence establishing that these two substances were heroin and methamphetamine.
Mocaby fails the third prong of the fundamental error analysis.
II.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mocaby
A.

Introduction
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the mandatory

minimum sentence followed by a 16-year indeterminate sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Where a sentence is within statutory limits, it will not be reversed on appeal

absent an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.” State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228,
229, 984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825
P.2d 482, 490 (1992); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1982)).
When examining a trial court’s exercise of discretion, an appellate court inquires
whether: (1) the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable
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legal standards; and (3) the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
(citations omitted).

C.

The Indeterminate Portion Of Mocaby’s Sentence Was Not Excessive And The
District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Mocaby’s sentence was within statutory limits, and on appeal, she does not argue

otherwise. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 17.) Mocaby argues that there were mitigating
factors that made the indeterminate portion of her sentence excessive. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 16-18.) Mocaby argues the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced
Mocaby to sixteen years of indeterminate time because she has substance abuse problems,
a supportive family and a difficult childhood. (See id.) Mocaby’s argument on appeal
fails. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
As an initial matter, while Mocaby cursorily cites to the abuse of discretion
standard of review, she fails to explicitly articulate which of the three prongs the district
court failed to meet. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-18.) The Idaho Supreme Court has
disproved of this practice, finding it “fatally deficient” to an appellant’s case:
We note that this Court has seen an increasing number of cases where a
party completely fails to address the factors we consider when evaluating a
claimed abuse of discretion. We emphasize that when a party “does not
contend that the district court failed to perceive the issue as one of
discretion, that the district court failed to act within the boundaries of this
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it or that the district court did not reach its decision by
an exercise of reason,” such a conclusory argument is “fatally deficient” to
the party’s case. “We will not consider assignments of error not supported
by argument and authority in the opening brief.”
State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n. 2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n. 2 (2017) (quoting
Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 849, 855, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016)).
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Even if this Court reaches the merits of Mocaby’s sentencing argument, the
district court did not abuse its discretion. First, the district court rightly perceived the
indeterminate portion of Mocaby’s sentence as one of discretion. (See 4/6/17 Tr., p. 7, L.
16 – p. 9, L. 19.) The district court stated:
I’ve considered the facts that I’m required to consider in every case, and
that includes the protection of society, deterrence of crime, the
rehabilitation of the offender as well as punishment. The mandatory
minimums in this case drives much of the determination; however, the
court still considers those factors in considering any indeterminate time
and what is appropriate in this particular case.
(4/6/17 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 16-23.)
Second, the district court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with the applicable legal standards.

The legal standards applicable to

sentencing are well established, “(1) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.
App. 1982) (citing State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978); State v.
Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)). As a matter of policy in Idaho
the “primary consideration” is the “good order and protection of society” and “[a]ll other
factors must be subservient to that end. Id. (citing Moore, 78 Idaho at 363, 304 P.2d at
1103). Here, the district court properly considered these factors. (See 4/6/17 Tr., p. 7, L.
16 – p. 9, L. 19.)
Finally, the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. The
district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence followed by a 16-year
indeterminate sentence.

This is a reasonable sentence considering the severity of
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Mocaby’s crimes and prior criminal history. Mocaby was found guilty of trafficking in
over 28 grams of heroin, plus possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver.
(See R., p. 170.) The jury also found that Mocaby had committed two prior felonies,
possession of a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance, and thus was
a habitual offender. (R., p. 171.) The district court could have potentially imposed a life
sentence.
Mocaby declined to participate in the presentence process in this case. (PSI, p. 1.)
However, Mocaby’s prior PSI provide a substantial amount of information regarding
Mocaby’s prior criminal activities, probation violations, period of retained jurisdiction
and background. (See PSI, pp. 1-270.) Mocaby’s prior PSI assessed Mocaby’s overall
risk level as “High.” (PSI, p. 3.) They also reported disciplinary issues on a prior period
of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp. 3-8). Mocaby also had prior jail incidents, including
threating another inmate. (PSI, pp. 22-30.) Mocaby also previously violated probation.
(R., pp. 83-85.) Thus, considering Mocaby’s history, including a prior delivery of a
controlled substance conviction, it was reasonable for the district court to impose 16 years
of indeterminate time. In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at
568, 650 P.2d at 710. The district court acted within the bounds of reason. Mocaby has
failed to show the district court abused its discretion.
Mocaby argues that because of her substance abuse problems the district court
should have imposed a lesser indeterminate sentence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-18.)
This argument does not carry much weight. It is reasonable to impose a period of
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indeterminate sentence for a defendant who has substance abuse problems because it
permits the defendant to have a chance to assimilate back into society while having some
supervision and help with substance abuse problems. This is especially true when the
problems are long-term, such as here with Mocaby. The district court acted reasonably by
providing Mocaby with 16 years indeterminate, because it gives her a good incentive to
get and stay clean and provides an element of supervision to make sure she does so. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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